Table of contents
Articles
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Attaining efficiency with imperfect public monitoring and one-sided Markov adverse selection
Daniel Barron |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW VIEW Supplementary Appendix 957–978 |
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Equilibria in symmetric games: theory and applications
Andreas Hefti |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW Supplementary Appendix 979–1002 |
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Choice overload and asymmetric regret
Gokhan Buturak and Ozgur Evren |
Abstract
1029–1056 |
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Friends and enemies: a model of signed network formation
Timo Hiller |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW Supplementary Appendix 1057–1087 |
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Bayesian games with a continuum of states
Ziv Hellman and Yehuda John Levy |
Abstract
PRINT PRINT VIEW 1089–1120 |
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Sovereign debt and incentives to default with uninsurable risks
Gaetano Bloise, Herakles Polemarchakis, and Yiannis Vailakis |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 1121–1154 |
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Active learning with a misspecified prior
Drew Fudenberg, Gleb Romanyuk, and Philipp Strack |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 1155–1189 |
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Rational expectations and farsighted stability
Bhaskar Dutta and Rajiv Vohra |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 1191–1227 |
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Capital-labor substitution, structural change and growth
Francisco Alvarez-Cuadrado , Ngo Van Long, and Markus Poschke |
Abstract
PRINT PRINT VIEW 1229–1266 |
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Preference discovery and experimentation
Kevin Cooke |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 1307–1348 |
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Characterization and uniqueness of equilibrium in competitive insurance
Vitor Farinha Luz |
Abstract
PRINT PRINT PRINT VIEW 1349–1391 |
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Double auction with interdependent values: incentives and efficiency
Fuhito Kojima and Takuro Yamashita |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 1393–1438 |